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Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement and Beijing’s Failure to Honor
the Basic Law
Over the past few months Hong Kong has been deeply embedded in political change and protests. These debates
and confrontations in Hong Kong have had a particular constitutional character grounded in disputes over
interpretation of the Hong Kong Basic Law’s constitutional text.[1] Recent actions initiated by Beijing have, in the
public eye, called into question solemn commitments made to Hong Kong under the “one country, two systems”
model promised in the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration.[2] A series of reports and decisions issued this past
year have been the source of public discontent. This paper will consider these causes and suggest avenues to a
solution going forward.
The recent protests in Hong Kong have largely been driven by the Hong Kong Basic Law, which provides in Article
45 an “ultimate aim” of universal suffrage in Hong Kong. These disputes over democratic development are
grounded in Article 31 of China’s 1982 Constitution, which provides for a “one country, two systems” model for
China to resume sovereignty over peripheral areas.[3] This model has so far been applied to Hong Kong and
Macau and is on offer to Taiwan.
For Hong Kong this model took on precise international legal form in the 1984 Sino British Joint Declaration, which
is a treaty fully registered with the United Nations by both parties. The Joint Declaration provides for the return of
Hong Kong to China under a model that includes Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong with a “high degree of
autonomy, except in foreign and defense affairs.”[4] To sustain this autonomy, the Joint Declaration provides
guarantees of democratic reform, human rights and the rule of law, and further stipulates its content into the Hong
Kong Basic Law.[5]
The Hong Kong Basic Law was promulgated in 1990 and came into force in 1997 upon the handover. The Joint
Declaration’s requirement that the legislature be chosen by elections and the chief executive by “elections or
consultations to be held locally” took shape in Basic Law democratic reform commitments. Articles 45 and 68 of the
Basic Law provide for gradual and orderly progress with the ultimate aim being universal suffrage to elect both the
chief executive and the legislative council.  This is accompanied by the promised guarantee of maintaining Hong
Kong’s existing legal system and a catalogue of liberal human rights, as stipulated in the Joint Declaration. Of
particular contention over recent months has been that Article 45 of the Basic Law provides that “The ultimate aim
is the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative
nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures.”
In 2007 the National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPC Standing Committee) issued a decision
declaring that the ultimate aim of universal suffrage provided in the Basic Law could be achieved in the 2017
election of the chief executive and, after that, in 2020 for the legislative council.[6] The failure of Beijing to fully
carry out this commitment has been the source of recent protest in Hong Kong. This failure has raised concern
over Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy and rule of law that go beyond the mechanics of electoral democracy.
The 2007 NPC Standing Committee Decision also indicated that the nominating committee “may be formed with
reference to” the existing Election Committee that has elected the first three chief executives.[7] That the Election
Committee is generally considered a heavily pro-Beijing body led to the suspicion that Beijing intended to
manipulate the nomination process.
The Summer of Discontent
Two documents issued by Beijing have been the source of public discontent over recent months. On June 10th,
2014 the People’s Republic of China (PRC) State Council issued an unexpected White Paper on the “one country,
two systems” policy applied in Hong Kong.[8] This was followed on August 31, 2014 by the NPC Standing
Committee Decision on Election of the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council.[9] The NPC Standing
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Committee Decision imposed a system of vetting candidates to present to the voters that appeared to undermine
the Basic Law promise of universal suffrage.
These documents combined to cause great public concern that Beijing is rolling back the commitments in the “one
country, two systems” model in Hong Kong. The first response was a boycott of classes by university and
secondary students. Student protesters from the boycott and the group called Occupy Central in Love and Peace
(hereinafter “Occupy Central”) combined to mobilize protesters to block the streets of the central commercial
districts in Hong Kong. The public outrage over these Beijing moves, some preliminary reports by the Hong Kong
Government, and some heavy-handed police tactics using tear gas, brought tens of thousands of protesters to the
streets. As reported around the world, protesters occupied and blocked key street arteries near the government
offices in the Admiralty area near Central Hong Kong and in the dense commercial districts of Mong Kok and
Causeway Bay.[10]
The reform discussions giving rise to these protests got started in 2013, with the Hong Kong Government
scheduling a five-month consultation over democratic reform.[11] Such political reform was to be in furtherance of
the Basic Law commitment to universal suffrage and the 2007 NPC Standing Committee Decision signaling it
could go forward. The protesters also got an early start. Early in 2013 the Occupy Central movement proclaimed it
would launch a campaign of civil disobedience to occupy Central Hong Kong if the Government proposal for
democratic reform did not match international standards.[12]
As the Government’s five-month consultation began in early 2014, issues began to take shape as various groups
submitted their proposals for democratic reform to the Hong Kong Government committee set up to conduct the
consultation.[13] This committee was lead by the number two official in the Hong Kong Government with two key
ministers rounding out the committee of three. Distrustful of Beijing’s intentions, student groups and democratic
politicians demanded a system of civil or party nominations to nominate the Chief Executive candidates to be
presented to the voters. Though these proposals generally accepted that any such civil or party nominations had to
pass through the nominating committee provided for in the Basic Law, the idea was generally that nomination of
candidates with sufficient popular and/or party support would be binding to the nominating committee. Some so-
called moderate proposals avoided the Basic Law challenge by advancing civil recommendations not binding to
the nominating committee.
During the five-month consultation, a parade of Beijing officials, their political supporters, and some local officials
lectured Hong Kong on their Beijing-friendly views of Basic Law requirements. Civil and party nominations were
condemned as violating the Basic Law Article 45 requirement of nomination by a “broadly representative
nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures.” Beijing and Government officials insisted that
the nominating committee’s powers must be substantive. Hong Kong was told that any candidate for chief
executive “must love the country and love Hong Kong,” an expression widely viewed as excluding candidates from
the more popular pan-democratic camp. Pro-Beijing submissions to the consultation suggested that the nominating
committee be roughly based on the existing Election Committee, a committee largely made up of Beijing
supporters that was used to elect the first three chief executives. A fifty percent threshold for nomination was
promoted and suggestions were made that the number of candidates nominated be limited to two or three.[14]
Democrats suspected these proposals aimed to set up a system to vet candidates and exclude pan-democrats.
At the end of the consultation the White Paper set the tone of the debate to follow. Though it said little about
democratic reform it clearly sent the message that Beijing is the boss. This tone greatly contrasted with the
message given earlier to Hong Kong people in conjunction with the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law. Hong
Kong investors and people were told throughout the handover period to “put their hearts at ease.”[15] These
earlier documents were also taken by Beijing to the capitals of the world to invite foreign governments to treat
Hong Kong separately for purposes of commercial and other external relations outside mainstream foreign policy
and defense.
In a sharp change of tone, Hong Kong people were now being told in the White Paper that all authority for the
Hong Kong model comes from Beijing. Some Hong Kong people were said to have “confused and lopsided” views.
The White Paper appears to nearly dismiss the continued importance of the Sino-British Joint Declaration, claiming
Beijing as the sole authority for the “one country, two systems” policy. As the sole source of this policy, Beijing was
said to have the authority to interpret or amend the Basic Law as it chooses. In a surprising claim, given the lack of
the rule of law on the mainland, the NPC Standing Committee is now identified as the guardian of the rule of law—
a role most Hong Kong people associate with the Hong Kong courts. Over the strong objection of the Hong Kong
Bar Association, judges are characterized as administrators and are expected to be patriots and guardians of
national security. In a signal of what would come in the NPC Standing Committee Decision, the pro-Beijing
Election Committee is characterized as “an expression of equal representation and broad representativeness.”
Hong Kong people were formally told the Chief Executive “must be a person who loves the country and Hong
Kong.” This requirement is widely viewed as code for excluding candidates from the more popular pan-democratic
camp.
Adding to Hong Kong’s anxiety, the mid-July Consultative Report[16] and the Report of the Chief Executive to the
NPC Standing Committee[17] on the need to change the method for electing the chief executive were generally
thought to misrepresent and distort popular Hong Kong views. This distortion tracked a long held perception in
Hong Kong that the Hong Kong Government generally represents Beijing more than it does Hong Kong. 
Regarding the consultation, the reports indicate that “mainstream opinion” favors exclusive power to nominate
candidates in the nominating committee; that the “community generally agrees the Chief Executive should love the
country and love Hong Kong”; that “relatively more views” agree the nominating committee should be formed like
the current Election Committee; and that “quite a number of views” suggest candidates must obtain the support of
a “certain portion” (meaning 50 percent) of the nominating committee to show ”cross sector support” in the
committee. No mention is made of the nearly 800,000 voters who effective rejected all of these positions in a civil
referendum organized by Occupy Central. Academics later reported that over 90 percent of the submissions
considered by the Consultative Committee came from block submissions from the pro-Government camp.
Conveniently, no effort was made to look beyond these submissions to more accurately gauge community
sentiment.
The NPC Standing Committee accepted the Government reports without question and issued a very conservative
decision noted above. That decision adopted the “number of members, composition and formation method” of the
Election Committee as the basis for forming the nominating committee, required a 50 percent threshold for
nomination by the nominating committee, and limited the number of nominees to two to three. The nominees are
required to “love the country and love Hong Kong.” These devises under the control of a very conservative pro-
Beijing nominating committee will effectively block any pan-democrat from nomination.
In blocking opposition candidates, Beijing dismisses the widely recognized international view that universal
suffrage requires not only that everyone can vote but also that they be given a free choice of candidates, without
discrimination for political opinion or otherwise. These requirements were outlined by the Human Rights
Committee of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in its General Comment number 25
on ICCPR Article 25.[18] Beijing has claimed that there are no international standards for elections.
In taking such liberty with the term universal suffrage, the Standing Committee not only undermines Hong Kong’s
democratic development but also clearly puts the rule of law in jeopardy. In simple terms, the rule of law requires
that nobody is above the law and everyone is subject to the law applied in the ordinary manner. A central
government that can take such liberty with terms such as universal suffrage that protect core human rights is
clearly operating above the law. In this sense, the NPC Standing Committee Decision appears to exercise the
broad authority claimed in the White Paper.
Popular Sentiment and the Looming Outcome
All of these moves generated the fierce public objection evident in the Hong Kong protests and occupation. Many
Hong Kong people fear their core values of the rule of law, democracy and human rights promised in the Basic
Law are now being undermined. The widespread participation in the civil disobedience movement lead by student
activists and Occupy Central tends to demonstrate the gravity of this concern.
Civil disobedience has never been widely practiced in Hong Kong protests. The ongoing protests to the date of
this writing have remained peaceful, though the police have used tear gas and anti-occupy demonstrators have
used some violence against the pro-democracy protesters. These protests have involved a competition between
the protesters and the Government for the hearts and minds of Hong Kong people. A Government that has
generally been seen as representing Beijing over Hong Kong people and that issued the recent misleading reports
has to date been losing the battle for hearts and minds. But the obstructions to daily life caused by the occupy
movement, if allowed to persist, may tilt the scales back the other way.
Regardless of the outcome, it seems clear that trust in both the local and Beijing governments has been severely
damaged. The public takes a dim view of the many official statements that misrepresent Basic Law guarantees
and social reality. Since there is the widespread view that Beijing is unlikely to back down in the face of protests, it
rests on the Hong Kong Government to redeem the Government’s image. So far the government has made little
effort to do so. After the disastrous use of tear gas by the police, the government took a more passive “wait and
see”-approach. Government leaders first scheduled and cancelled talks with the student leaders. Then, after
further protest, talks were held openly in a televised broadcast on October 21st, 2014, though both sides mostly
just restated their position with no significant compromise.
To redeem the Government’s image, much more is required. The Government should be seen to take on board the
important public concerns over the threat to core Hong Kong values and Basic Law commitments evident in the
Beijing White Paper and NPC Standing Committee Decision. The Government should submit to the NPC Standing
Committee an addendum to the earlier Hong Kong Government reports to more accurately reflect local views.[19]
The Government should be seen to work with Hong Kong democrats to come up with a solution that opens up the
electoral process to meet international standards.
The protesters have insisted on resignation of the current Chief Executive and Beijing’s withdrawal of the NPC
Standing Committee Decision. While the Chief Executive’s resignation is desirable, it would not fully address the
current impasse. Beijing is not likely to simply withdraw its decision in the face of protests. Avenues to regaining
public trust will not fully be explored without a fundamental change in Hong Kong Government policy to more
proactively defend Hong Kong’s autonomy and represent public concerns. More honesty in official representations
would be a good starting point. None of this would require directly confronting Beijing but merely a better effort to
secure Hong Kong’s interests. Then avenues to build trust and secure Beijing’s willingness to revise its decision
might be explored. The autonomy model that has long served both the interests of Hong Kong and Beijing
presumes such an intermediary role for the local government, a role that has long been in short supply. Such a
moderate approach would clearly serve Beijing’s interests better than the confrontational approach taken to date.
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